To all appearances, the recently convened Iraq Inquiry into British involvement in the war which destroyed Iraq will reiterate information that is already known, and will be used by participants to absolve themselves of any personal responsibility for the crimes perpetrated against Iraq.
Baghdad burning
Gordon Brown, the UK’s unelected premier and chief accomplice to George Bush’s chief accomplice, Tony Blair, personally selected Sir John Chilcot to head the committee of inquiry. Chilcot had previously served on the flawed Butler Review into the reliability of the intelligence claims made to justify the war. Brown also hand picked the other four members of the committee – all government insiders of the revolving door variety, including Sir Martin Gilbert, who in addition to openly supporting the march to war, predicted that Bush and Blair would be remembered alongside Roosevelt and Churchill for their deeds in Iraq.
Brown originally ordered the hearings to be held in secret, but rescinded this order under pressure from various sources, including Chilcot himself. In the end, Brown was evidently convinced that public airing of the proceedings would present little challenge to his own sanctimonious posturing on the war and would be preferable to the public outcry that would accompany attempts to keep the hearings secret.
The first week of the Chilcot Inquiry has certainly not been a disappointment for fans of cringing dissimulation. So far, the hearing room drama has focussed on the revelation of a profound secret that everyone already knew: Washington was pushing for a military assault on Iraq even before 9/11, and pushed harder for one after that event. None of the witnesses believed at the time that Saddam had the military capabilities that the US accused him of possessing. But the broad picture that emerges from their testimony is that, somehow, the Americans managed to get control over the Prime Minister’s brain, and the UK policy establishment then had no choice but to fall in line behind their leader and see events through to their cataclysmic conclusion.
- Inquiry panel at work
Another deep dark non-secret to emerge is that high level functionaries in the British government doubted US assertions of a link between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden. Of course, in reality, no one in the US government believed this either, and it strains credibility to think that any of the witnesses believed that their US counterparts believed this. But none of the inquiry witnesses so far has had the courage to suggest that the alleged connection between bin Laden and Saddam was a calculated lie intended to channel public sentiment from outrage at the terrorist events into support for the invasion of a sovereign nation that happens to have huge oil reserves. Instead, they allow the obfuscation a modicum of legitimacy by suggesting that US officials may have been genuinely worried. Thus Sir Peter Ricketts, former chairman of the joint intelligence committee, states:
“Certainly, at that early stage, they didn’t produce evidence, but the tone of voice was more, ‘If there turns out to be a link between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden, then you know, that’s going to have major implications for Iraq and Saddam Hussein’.” (transcript of the Iraq Inquiry hearing, 24 November 2009)
The truth of the matter – that everyone, including the Americans, knew that there was no link between Al Qaeda and Iraq – is left entirely to surmise. Perhaps this can be put down to the British penchant for understatement. It will be a welcome surprise if this inquiry produces anything more than understatement and opportunities for surmise.
In a similar vein, Sir William Patey, British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, makes the shocking revelation that that 9/11 changed things “a bit”. As with the bogus Al Qaeda link, he, Ricketts and other hearings participants can acknowledge that before 9/11 the US had already embraced regime change as policy. It goes without saying, however, that neither he nor anyone else in the room will admit that the US took 9/11 as a pretext for full scale roll-out of the neo-conservative’s international policy agenda – the “new Pearl Harbor” that Condoleeza Rice and her co-conspirators were looking for, and that by participating in the military assault the UK became an accessory in the attempt to realize that agenda.
In fact, Ricketts indicates his (understated) acceptance that 9/11 actually was connected with Iraq, if only by analogy:
“Not to say that we had any evidence that Iraq was directly linked in any way to the 9/11 attack, we didn’t have any such evidence, but it did throw into greater relief the threat from Iraqi WMD without any inspector control over it, and I think that’s probably the way in which 9/11 impacted Iraq policy in the first place.” (transcript of the Iraq Inquiry hearing, 24 November 2009)
Bush & Blair
Ricketts seems to be saying that despite there being no evidence of a direct link between Iraq and 9/11, the events of 9/11 suddenly woke everyone up to the deadly potential of Iraq’s conjectural weapons of mass destruction. The implication is that one could almost understand where the Yanks were coming from. One could understand this if someone in Rickett’s position could somehow be ignorant of the fact that Iraq’s infrastructure had been destroyed in the Gulf War and by a decade of sanctions; that the country was under constant aerial surveillance and periodic air attack; that it had had a series of international weapons inspections; and that even if it had WMDs, it didn’t possess the means to deliver these to targets in the UK or the US – factors that together rendered Iraq an unlikely source of anxiety. No doubt, the entire UK policy establishment did know this, yet apparently 9/11 could still “throw into greater relief the threat from Iraqi WMD”.
One of the supposedly major revelations of the inquiry so far is the observation by Sir Christopher Meyer, former British ambassador to the US, that Tony Blair first used the term “regime change” the day after a private meeting with Bush at the latter’s Texas ranch in April 2002. It would appear that Bush sprinkled Blair with fairy dust which made him change his stance on the issue. Apparently, Bush must also have given Blair some of the fairy dust to take away and use on his cabinet and advisers.
Apparently as a result of being so dusted, according to Meyer:
“We found ourselves scrabbling for the smoking gun, which was another way of saying ‘it’s not that Saddam has to prove that he’s innocent, we’ve now bloody well got to try and prove that he’s guilty.’” (Reuters, 26 November 2009)
This is an interesting turn of phrase, by the way. Normally in British and American jurisprudence there is a presumption of innocence until guilt is proven. This is why the IAEA’s inspectors were involved in trying to establish whether in fact there was a WMD program in Saddam’s Iraq. Meyer however, like the Americans, seems to have regarded this supposed approach as a “bloody” inconvenience.
However, the more orthodox line, that the UK only sought compliance with UN resolutions, is espoused by Ricketts:
“We quite clearly distanced ourselves in Whitehall from talk about regime change… there was no increased appetite among UK ministers for military action in Iraq [up until March 2002].” (The Guardian, 24 November 2009 )
…and by Ambassador Patey:
“I mean, my sense was that the Americans didn’t hold great store by the inspection regime and, therefore, there was always a debate as to just how much effort were they prepared to put into getting [UN Resolution] 1284 implemented. I think we were almost more enthusiastic about getting inspectors, had greater faith that the inspection regime would ultimately deliver the answers on WMD and lead to a different situation in Iraq.” (transcript of the Iraq Inquiry hearing, 24 November 2009)
“Almost” more enthusiastic?
In any case, up to March 2002 there was supposedly “no increased appetite” for war in the UK policy establishment. So what happened to change that? Perhaps for some there really wasn’t a change, for as Meyer said:
“We could have achieved more by playing a tougher role … if, for example, at [Bush's ranch in] Crawford Tony Blair had said: “I want to help you, George, on this but I have to say, in all honesty, that I will not be able to take part in any military operation unless we have palpable progress on the [Arab-Israeli] peace process and we have absolute clarity on what happens in Iraq if it comes up.” (The Guardian, 26 November 2009)
In other words, according to Meyer the illegal attack on Iraq might have been okay except that it was done in the wrong way, without adequate preparatory horse-trading.
Finger-pointing and backside-covering seems to be the general theme so far. Everyone had their doubts and reservations about the slide into war, but no one will admit their failure to try to halt this march towards massacre. There is still hope that future sessions will bring some truly new information to the surface. At the very least, there is the prospect of Tony Blair squirming to answer an uncomfortable question or two when his turn comes. But despite his tendency to spout embarrassing platitudes as if they were profound truths, it is likely that the Teflon Prime Minister will get away with it again.
Wistfully, Meyer intoned: “I think what would Margaret Thatcher have done.”
Indeed, what would Maggie have done? One shudders to imagine!
